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I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine that you are a forty-year-old worker living in New York City
and you are looking to move your family to Texas in the near future. You
apply for a job in Houston with Company X and are called in for an
interview. The interviewer finds you "suitably qualified" and informs you
of this immediately. Company X then sends you to the doctor to have a
physical examination according to company policy. After you fill out va-
rious employment-related forms, you also read and sign the company's
employment agreement that states: "The employer may terminate the
employee at-will for any reason, or for no reason at all."
After signing all of the forms required, Company X informs you that
you need to be on a plane returning to Texas in ten days, and they will
send the tickets and other information to you. Relying upon the employ-
ment contracts and information you received from Company X, you re-
turn to New York City and immediately terminate your current
employment. In addition, you pack up your family, withdraw your kids
from school, hire a moving company, and put your house on the market.
A few days later, Company X calls and informs you that they have
found someone better qualified to fill the position. You, of course, file
suit against Company X seeking recovery in detrimental reliance (i.e.,
promissory estoppel). Does the court allow you to recover any damages
for the expenses and foregone opportunities you incurred due to your
reliance on Company X's employment? The answer to this question in
Texas is uncertain.
The role that promissory estoppel plays in contract law in general has
received much attention.' Some writers claim that promissory estoppel
1. See generally Daniel A. Farber & John H. Matheson, Beyond Promissory Estoppel:
Contract Law and the "Invisible Handshake," 52 U. CHi. L. REV. 903, 910 (1985) (explain-
ing how the courts are extending the theory of promissory estoppel without detrimental
reliance on a promise); Edward Yorio & Steve Thel, The Promissory Basis of Section 90,
101 YALE L.J. 111, 113 (1991) (observing that courts have begun enforcing promises rather
than protecting reliance); Eric M. Holmes, Restatement of Promissory Estoppel, 32 WIL-
LAMEITE L. REV. 263 (1996) (providing a jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction study of the use of
promissory estoppel in all fifty states, showing that all American jurisdictions apply some
form of promissory estoppel grounded in Section 90 of the Restatement (Second) of Con-
tracts). But see Robert A. Hillman, Questioning the "New Consensus" on Promissory Es-
toppel: An Empirical and Theoretical Study, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 580, 580-81 (1998)
(showing reliance is remarkably unsuccessful in courts and demonstrating the crucial role
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will "swallow up" the bargain theory of contract law.2 Other writers
claim that courts have begun enforcing any promise made in "furtherance
of an economic activity ' 3 or simply "serious" promises,4 whether the
promisee relied on them or not.
Recently, Professor Robert A. Hillman issued an empirical and theo-
retical study contradicting several of these assumptions concurring how
the courts are now applying promissory estoppel. 5 Hillman's article
shows that promissory estoppel is not the "be all and end all" of contract
law; in fact, the article shows that promissory estoppel, as a theory, has
been predominantly unsuccessful in the courts.6 According to the cases
that Hillman compiled and analyzed, 7 the highest number of promissory
estoppel claims were brought within the employment context.8 Of those
promissory estoppel claims brought within the employment context, only
4.23% of the cases decided on the merits actually succeeded. 9 One would
think that since the greatest number of cases based upon promissory es-
toppel have been brought in the area of employment, courts would have
agreed upon a method of dealing with employee claims. But the use of
promissory estoppel in the employment context, particularly in the area
of employment at-will, seems to be an area of great confusion for some
Texas courts. 10
The issue at stake in the Texas judicial system is whether the courts will
allow the use of promissory estoppel to circumvent the employment at-
will doctrine, possibly causing its gradual demise. For example, in the hy-
pothetical mentioned above, you, as the employee, would hope there
would be some form of relief in the courts that would allow you to re-
cover the losses you incurred while relying on the promise of employment
made by the employer. But the employer would claim that you agreed to
an at-will employment relationship, a relationship that she was free to
terminate at any time for any reason; therefore, there was nothing upon
which you could rely. Which theory is correct? How do the roles of
promissory estoppel and employment at-will interact with one another, or
do they at all?
of reliance in successful and unsuccessful claims); Phuong N. Pham, The Waning of Promis-
sory Estoppel, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1263 (1994) (noting the decline in the use of promis-
sory estoppel by the courts).
2. See, e.g., GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 72 (1974).
3. Farber & Matheson, supra note 1, at 905.
4. Yorio & Thel, supra note 1, at 113.
5. See Hillman, supra note 1.
6. See id. at 580.
7. See id. at 582-84 (explaining how the cases were compiled and analyzed by date, a
52 question coding sheet, and the subject matter, nature, dispute and posture of the cases).
8. See id. at 593.
9. See id. at 592.
10. See Roberts v. Geosource Drilling Servs., Inc., 757 S.W.2d 48 (Tex. App.-Hous-
ton [1st Dist.] 1988, no writ). But see Collins v. Allied Fharmacist Management, Inc., 871
S.W.2d 929 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, no writ). See generally Cortlan H.
Maddux, Employers Beware! The Emerging Use of Promissory Estoppel as an Exception to
Employment At Will, 49 BAYLOR L. REV. 197 (1997) (examining Texas courts' confusion
when applying promissory estoppel in the employment context).
2000]
SMU LAW REVIEW
This Comment takes an in-depth look into the role promissory estoppel
plays in at-will employment cases in Texas. The Comment is divided into
six sections. First, it briefly examines the evolution and history of both
employment at-will and promissory estoppel in Texas. Second, it exam-
ines two leading Texas cases which have ruled both for and against prom-
issory estoppel's use in the at-will context. Third, this Comment takes a
more specific look at what factors one Texas court considered when al-
lowing promissory estoppel to circumvent the at-will doctrine and why
those factors are not appropriate considerations in Texas. Fourth, it takes
a look into the justifications other jurisdictions use in allowing successful
promissory estoppel claims and how that could affect Texas courts. Fifth,
it examines the motives and authority of one Texas court that allowed
promissory estoppel to circumvent the employment at-will doctrine. And
finally, this Comment concludes by discussing the validity of the at-will
doctrine and how the Texas Supreme Court should approach the issue if
given the opportunity in the future.
II. BACKGROUND
A. PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL
1. The History and Evolution of Estoppel
The doctrine of estoppel that exists in the courts today is a collection of
several hundred years of development.' I Estoppel's origin can be fol-
lowed back to Medieval England where it was used for such things as
estoppel by record' 2 and estoppel by deed. 13 Even before the powerful
"bargained-for-exchange" theory of consideration began to seemingly
dominate contract law, promises were being enforced primarily upon reli-
ance. 14 The fundamental purpose of contracts was to protect justifiable
reliance on a promise. 15 But courts in the nineteenth century were not so
forgiving when it came to relying on a promise due to the fact that it was
such a common occurrence. 16
The nineteenth century's "bargained-for-exchange" theory focused on
11. See, e.g., J. EWART, AN EXPOSITION OF THE PRINCIPLES OF ESTOPPEL By MISREP-
RESENTA'ION 1 (1900); M. BIGELOW, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EsroPPEL AND ITS
APPLICATION IN PRACTICE 53 (1876); Michael C. Pitou, Equitable Estoppel: Its Genesis,
Development and Application in Government Contracting, 19 PUB. CON'T. L.J. 606 (1990).
12. See Pitou, supra note 11, at 607-08 (explaining that whatever was recorded in the
King's court was accepted, could not be contradicted, and was also used to limit the dura-
tion of judicial pleadings serving as a modern day res judicata).
13. See id. at 608 (explaining that a party could be bound by prior written representa-
tions if they were under sign and seal).
14. See Jay M. Feinman, Promissory Estoppel and Judicial Method, 97 HARv. L. REV.
678, 679 (1984) (stating that "promises were often enforced primarily because the promisee
had relied on the promise to her detriment or to the promisor's benefit."). See generally
Maddux, supra note 10, at 204.
15. See Michael B. Metzger & Michael J. Phillips, Promissory Estoppel and Reliance
on Illusory Promises, 44 Sw. L.J. 841, 843 (1990).
16. See Warren A. Seavey, Reliance upon Gratuitous Promises or Other Conduct, 64
HARV. L. REV. 913, 924-925 (1951).
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the need for consideration in promises made in contract formation 17
rather than looking to reliance as the dominant factor. Thus, the first
Restatement of Contracts focuses on consideration as the dominant fac-
tor. 1 8 The bargained-for-exchange theory's unbending requirement of
consideration in contract formation sometimes led to unjust results sim-
ply because the formal requirements of consideration were not met. 19
The need to protect individuals who rely on future promises developed
into what is known today as modern day "promissory estoppel. ''2 0
2. The Birth of Promissory Estoppel
The first person to introduce the term "promissory estoppel" was Sa-
muel Williston.2' Although Williston was one of the dominant influences
in drafting the first Restatement of Contracts,22 it was Professor Corbin
who was determined to get promissory estoppel into the Restatement. 23
Through continued discussion and debate, Professor Corbin prevented
the complete ascendancy of consideration in contract law, and promissory
17. Justice Holmes' well known statement of the bargain theory:
[I]t is the essence of a consideration, that, by the terms of the agreement, it is
given and accepted as the motive or inducement of the promise. Conversely,
the promise must be made and accepted as the conventional motive or in-
ducement for furnishing the consideration. The root of the whole matter is
the relation of reciprocal conventional inducement, each for the other, be-
tween consideration and promise.
OLIVER W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 293-94 (M. Howe ed., paperback ed. 1963).
18. See RESTATEMENT (FIRsT) OF CONTRACTS (1932).
19. See Seavey, supra note 16, at 925. In order to protect the promisee that had relied
upon a promise and did not meet the requirements of traditional consideration, the evolu-
tion of estoppel has been explained in one way as an excuse by the courts:
They had to find a new solution, or, at least, a new terminology. In such a
situation the word that comes instinctively to the mind of any judge is, of
course, "estoppel"-which is simply a way of saying that, for reasons which
the court does not care to discuss, there must be judgment for the plaintiff.
And in the contract cases after 1900 the word "estoppel," modulating into
such phrases as "equitable estoppel" and "promissory estoppel," began to
appear with increasing frequency.
GILMORE, supra note 2, at 64; see also Maddux, supra note 10, at 205.
20. Feinmann, supra note 14, at 680 n.18 (stating that the distinction between promis-
sory estoppel and equitable estoppel has been eliminated); see Maddux, supra note 10, at
205; see also Seavey, supra note 16, at 922-23 ("It has been said repeatedly that an action
for fraudulent misrepresentation will not lie where the misstatement refers only to future
events. It has now become clear, however, that every statement of the future includes
some statement of present facts." (footnote omitted)).
21. See GILMORE, supra note 2, at 60-64.
22. See id. at 59.
23. Professor Corbin, at a meeting of the Restatement group, challenged the group's
definition of consideration with numerous cases, holding their decision unexplainable:
Gentlemen, you are engaged in restating the common law of contracts. You
have recently adopted a definition of consideration. I now submit to you a
list of cases-hundreds, perhaps or thousands?-in which courts have im-
posed contractual liability under circumstances in which, according to your
definition, there would be no consideration and therefore no liability. Gen-
tlemen, what do you intend to do about these cases? . . The Restaters,




estoppel was formally recognized in Section 90.24
The recognition of Section 90 into the Restatement (not requiring any
bargained-for exchange), alongside Section 75(1)25 (explicitly requiring
that the action or forbearance must be bargained for), has been referred
to as an example of "the Restatement's schizophrenia, '26 the "Restate-
ment and the anti-Restatement, '2 7 or labeled the "Contract and anti-
Contract. ' 28 The doctrine of promissory estoppel within Section 90
lacked the one element that Section 75(1) of the Restatement required-
that the action or forbearance be bargained for.29 Nevertheless, Section
90 of the Restatement "recognizes the reliance element in the law of con-
tracts and, to a modified extent, substitutes reliance for the bargaining
element without which simple contracts are not normally enforceable. '30
Section 90 states:
A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce
action or forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third person
and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injus-
tice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise. The remedy
granted for breach may be limited as justice requires. 31
B. THE EMPLOYMENT AT-WILL DOCTRINE
The original employment at-will doctrine was stated by the Tennessee
Supreme Court in 1884:
[M]en must be left, without interference to buy and sell where they
please, and to discharge or retain employes [sic] at will for good
cause or for no cause, or even for bad cause without thereby being
guilty of an unlawful act per se. It is a right which an employe [sic]
may exercise in the same way, to the same extent, for the same cause
or want of cause .... All may dismiss their employes [sic] at will, be
24. Section 90 of the Restatement (First) of Contracts states:
A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or
forbearance of a definite and substantial character on the part of the prom-
isee and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice
can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise.
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 18, at § 90.
25. Section 75(1) of the Restatement (First) of Contracts reads:
(1) Consideration for a promise is
(a) an act other than a promise, or
(b) a forbearance, or
(c) the creation, modification or destruction of a legal relation, or
(d) a return promise, bargained for and given in exchange for the
promise.
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 18, at § 75(1).
26. GILMORE, supra note 2, at 60.
27. Id. at 68.
28. Id.
29. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 18, at § 75(1) ("Considera-
tion for a promise is an act other than a promise, or a forbearance, or the creation, modifi-
cation or destruction of a legal relation, or a return promise, bargained for and given in
exchange for the promise.").
30. Seavey, supra note 16, at 925.
31. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1981).
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they many or few, for good cause, for no cause or even for cause
morally wrong, without being thereby guilty of legal wrong.32
The modern-day employment at-will doctrine provides that an employ-
ment relationship for an indefinite term is "terminable at any time by
either party, with or without cause, absent an express agreement to the
contrary. '33 In the words of Richard Epstein, "the phrase 'at will' is two
words long and has the convenient virtue of meaning just what it says, no
more and no less."'34 Texas courts believe the same. Although other ju-
risdictions have been willing to at least partially abrogate the at-will doc-
trine,35 the Texas judicial structure and the Texas Legislature have been
very hesitant in allowing exceptions.
The Texas judicial structure has seemingly found every way possible to
preserve the at-will doctrine for both employers and employees. As a
result, there has been only one judicially-created public policy exception
to the doctrine in the last 105 years.36 In creating this public policy excep-
tion, the Texas Supreme Court held that public policy required an excep-
tion to the at-will doctrine when an employee has been discharged for
refusing to perform an illegal act ordered by his or her employer.
In addition, although the Texas Legislature has adopted several statu-
tory exceptions to the at-will employment structure, these exceptions are
narrowly defined and strictly interpreted. Statutory exceptions include
such things as: discharge based upon race, color, religion, handicap, na-
tional origin, age, sex;3 7 discharge based upon mental retardation; 38 dis-
charge based upon union membership;39 discharge due to attending
political convention 40 or jury service;41 and discharge for filing a worker's
compensation claim.42
32. Payne v. Western & Atl. R.R. Co., 81 Tenn. 507, 518-520 (1884), overruled on other
grounds by Hutton v. Watters, 179 S.W. 134 (Tenn. 1915).
33. See, e.g., Federal Express Corp. v. Dutschmann, 846 S.W.2d 282, 283 (Tex. 1993);
Schroeder v. Texas Iron Works, Inc., 813 S.W.2d 483, 489 (Tex. 1991); Hussong v. Schwan's
Sales Enter., Inc., 896 S.W.2d 320, 324 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, no writ);
Mott v. Montgomery County, 882 S.W.2d 635, 637 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1994, writ de-
nied); Amador v. Tan, 855 S.W.2d 131, 133 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1993, writ denied).
34. Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract At Will, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 947, 955
(1984).
35. States that have shown a willingness to at least partially abrogate the at-will doc-
trine are Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii,
Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Min-
nesota, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New
York, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Washington, West Virginia, and
Wisconsin. See Claudia E. Decker, The At-Will Doctrine: A Proposal To Modify The Texas
Employment Relationship, 36 BAYLOR L. REV. 667, 668 n.14 (1984).
36. See Sabine Pilot Serv., Inc., v. Hauck, 687 S.W.2d 733 (Tex. 1985) (creating an
exception to the at-will doctrine where an employee is fired for not participating in an
illegal activity).
37. See TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 21.051 (Vernon 1996).
38. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 592.015 (Vernon 1992).
39. See TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 101.052 (Vernon 1996).
40. See TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 161.007 (Vernon 1986).
41. See TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 122.001 (Vernon 1997).
42. See TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 451.001 (Vernon 1996).
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As stated above, if an employer and employee have an at-will employ-
ment relationship, the employer or employee each has the right to termi-
nate the employment relationship at any time, for any or no cause.43 In
addition, any time an employee is terminated, an at-will relationship is
presumed.44 However, if an employee can prove that their at-will em-
ployment relationship has been modified so that the employer is prohib-
ited from terminating the employee, the at-will relationship is no longer
effective .45
III. PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL IN AN AT-WILL ENVIRONMENT
A. THE CONFLICT IN THE TEXAS COURTS OF APPEAL
The Courts of Appeal in Texas disagree on what role promissory estop-
pel should play in Texas' powerful at-will employment doctrine. One
Texas court of appeals allowed an employee who detrimentally relied on
an employer's promise of at-will employment to sustain a cause of action
against the employer in promissory estoppel. Other Texas courts of ap-
peal have strongly disagreed and harshly criticized that court for allowing
an exception to the at-will doctrine that was not intended. The following
are the two leading cases on each side of the issue.
1. The Roberts Decision
In Roberts v. Geosource Drilling Services, Inc.,46 Roberts was an oil
drilling worker living in Louisiana who sought overseas employment with
Geosource Drilling Services. An interview was arranged in Houston,
Texas, where Roberts was informed that he was "suitably qualified" for
the position and was sent to have all of his vaccinations performed, em-
ployment-related forms filled out, and sign Geosource's employment
agreement. Geosource told Roberts that he would be leaving for his
overseas assignment in about ten days and that plane tickets would be
sent to him before then. Geosource knew that Roberts was currently em-
ployed. Roberts returned to Louisiana and terminated his current em-
ployment, informing his boss that he had another job. Several days later,
Geosource contacted Roberts and told him they did not need him any-
more because they had found someone better qualified to fill his position.
Roberts filed suit against Geosource alleging detrimental reliance upon
oral and written representations made by Geosource.
The Roberts court applied the Texas Supreme Court's formulations of
the required elements of promissory estoppel: (1) a promise, (2) the
promisor's forseeability of the promisee's reliance thereon, and (3) sub-
43. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
44. See Winters v. Houston Chronicle Publ'g Co., 795 S.W.2d 723 (Tex. 1990).
45. See, e.g., Comprehensive Care Corp. v. Bosch, 899 S.W.2d 435 (Tex. App.-
Amarillo 1995, no writ). For a general description of the ways in which an at-will relation-
ship may be modified, see Maddux, supra note 10.
46. 757 S.W.2d 48 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, no writ).
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stantial reliance by the promisee to his detriment.47 The court held that
because (1) Geosource made a promise of employment, (2) they foresaw
Roberts relying on that promise, and (3) Roberts substantially relied on
that promise by terminating his current employment to his expense and
detriment, that Roberts had satisfied the requirements of promissory es-
toppel.48 The court went further in articulating its decision by explaining
how Roberts was justified in relying upon the at-will promise by Ge-
osource due to the fact that the promise actually imposed a duty on Ge-
osource to employ Roberts, although not for a fixed duration, and that
duty was breached:
[Geosource's] undisputed oral promise clearly imposed a duty on Ge-
osource to employ Roberts-but not for a fixed duration-and that
duty was breached by Geosource. It is no answer that the parties'
written contract was for an employment-at-will, where the employer
foreseeably and intentionally induces the prospective employee to
materially change his position to his expense and detriment, and then
repudiates its obligations before the written contract begins to
operate.
If the appellant/promisee acts to his detriment in reliance upon the
promise of employment, or parts with some legal right or sustains
some legal injury as the inducement for the employment agreement,
we hold that there is sufficient consideration to bind the employer/
promisor to its promise.49
The court reversed summary judgment and remanded the case to the
trial court for further consideration.
2. Opposition to the Roberts Decision
The Roberts decision has been harshly criticized. One such example is
found in Collins v. Allied Pharmacist Management, Inc.,50 which con-
cerned a situation similar to that in Roberts. The plaintiffs, Collin and
Torry, were offered positions in a subsidiary of the defendant's company,
Allied. Allied's president, Allison, offered Collins a position as vice pres-
ident. The offer, as shown by a letter produced in court, outlined the
benefits of the position including a base salary of $70,000. Collins
claimed that he accepted the offer and immediately hired Torry. Both
Collins and Torry submitted resignations to their current employers in
reliance upon Allied's offer.
Similar to the Roberts case, the court found Collins and Torry to be at-
will employees which could be terminated at any time for no cause and
that Collins and Torry were terminated prior to the commencement of
work with Allied. In responding to the plaintiff's request for relief under
promissory estoppel, the court held that an at-will promise of employ-
47. See English v. Fischer, 660 S.W.2d 521, 524 (Tex. 1983).
48. See Roberts, 757 S.W.2d at 50.
49. Id. (emphasis added).
50. 871 S.W.2d 929 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, no writ).
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ment gives no assurance as to the employer's conduct and therefore can-
not be relied upon:
A promise to provide employment which is subject to termination at
any time or for any reason [at-will] does not provide any assurances
about the employer's future conduct, and does not provide a basis
for detrimental reliance as a matter of law. Moreover, promissory
estoppel may not be applied to recover reliance damages when there
is a valid contract terminable at will.51
In support of their argument, the plaintiffs had relied on the holding of
the court in Roberts, to which the court replied that Roberts was wrongly
decided and would completely destroy the at-will doctrine in many cases
if followed: "in our opinion, Roberts was wrongly decided; no Texas
cases have cited it and we decline to follow it. Rather, we believe Rob-
erts abrogates the employment at will doctrine in all cases where the em-
ployee must quit an existing job to accept a new offer of employment. '52
B. QUESTIONS REGARDING THE DECISIONS
Which court is correct in its holding? Should an employee be able to
detrimentally rely on an at-will employment promise from an employer?
What exactly is the employee relying on? Is there a difference between
liability if the employer fires an employee before employment begins
rather than afterwards? If the employer is held liable, what should she be
liable for? Are these decisions correctly following the doctrines of prom-
issory estoppel and employment at-will? An in-depth look into the ques-
tions the Roberts court creates will provide us with some answers to these
questions.
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE ROBERTS DECISION
A. PROBLEMS WITH THE PROMISE
1. The Promise
In Roberts,53 the court based their decision on the fact that Roberts
acted "to his detriment in reliance upon the promise of employment
.... -54 Had Geosource made a "promise of employment"? The relation-
ship between Roberts and Geosource was purely an employment at-will
relationship; therefore, is not all that Geosource promised to Roberts was
that it could terminate the employment relationship at any time, for any
or no cause? The answer to this question lies in the limitations that Texas
courts place on employers when terminating their at-will employees. As
discussed above, Texas follows the pure at-will employment doctrine with
only limited exceptions.
51. Id. at 937 (citation omitted).
52. Id.
53. 757 S.W.2d at 50.
54. Id.
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In Roberts,55 the employer apparently had not violated any of the stat-
utory or judicial exceptions to the at-will doctrine allowed in Texas.
Therefore, the Roberts court seemingly attempted to create a judicial ex-
ception of its own. The court described this "new exception" to the at-
will doctrine as a "duty" by stating: "[Geosource's] undisputed oral prom-
ise clearly imposed a duty on Geosource to employ Roberts. '56 What is
this newly created "duty" and is it an exception to the at-will doctrine in
Texas?
a. The Duty of Good Faith
One common implied exception to the at-will doctrine is the implied
covenant (duty) of good faith. Courts that imply a good faith require-
ment in employment contracts hold that since the employment relation-
ship is contractual, the implied covenant may accompany it.5 7 In French
v. Jadon, Inc.,5 8 the court stated this position clearly: "[t]he covenant of
good faith and fair dealing is implicit in at-will employment contracts...
it requires at a minimum that an employer not impair the right of an
employee to receive the benefits of the employment agreement." 59 While
other courts have followed, 60 the majority of courts have refused to rec-
ognize any covenant of good faith and fair dealing with regard to at-will
employment relationships.
61
b. The Duty of Good Faith in Texas
Texas, along with the majority, has refused to recognize the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing in the employment context. In
Rios v. Texas Commerce Bancshares, Inc.,62 plaintiff had taken a job with
the defendant as an assistant vice president/commercial loan officer. Af-
ter less than a year at work, the plaintiff received evaluations reflecting
his performance as "less than satisfactory. '63 After several additional
poor performance evaluations, the plaintiff was fired for insubordination
55. Id.
56. Id. (emphasis added).
57. See Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 316 A.2d 549 (N.H. 1974) (holding that the cove-
nant of good faith and fair dealing precludes discharges motivated by bad faith and
malice).
58. 911 P.2d 20 (Alaska 1996).
59. Id. at 24.
60. See, e.g., Huey v. Honeywell, Inc., 82 F.3d 327 (9th Cir. 1996); French, 911 P.2d at
20; Hummer v. Evans, 923 P.2d 981 (Idaho 1996). Other courts allow a more conservative
approach to the implied covenant of good faith. See, e.g., Varrallo v. Hammond Inc., 94 F.
3d 842 (3d Cir. 1996); Johnson v. Chesebrough Pond's U.S.A. Co., 918 F. Supp. 543 (D.
Conn. 1996); Madden v. Omega Optical, Inc., 683 A.2d 386 (Vt. 1996); Cook v. Zions First
Nat'l Bank, 919 P.2d 56 (Utah Ct. App. 1996), cert. denied, 925 P.2d 963 (Utah 1996).
61. See, e.g., Aiken v. Employer Health Servs., Inc., 81 F.3d 172 (10th Cir. 1996)
(showing no implied covenant of good faith in Oklahoma law); Dandridge v. Chromcraft
Corp., 914 F. Supp. 1396 (N.D. Miss. 1996) (holding that an employee failed to state a
cause of action based upon a good faith implied covenant); Huegerich v. IBP, Inc., 547
N.W.2d 216 (Iowa 1996) (showing a no exception rule for implied covenant of good faith).
62. 930 S.W.2d 809 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1996, writ denied).
63. Id. at 812.
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to his superior, poor job performance, and failure to comply with bank
policy. Plaintiff filed several claims against the bank, including breach of
the duty of good faith and fair dealing in an employment context. The
court began its analysis of the case by affirming the fact that Texas follows
the doctrine of employment at-will, and that employment may be termi-
nated at will and without cause. The court more specifically stated
"[a]bsent a specific contract term to the contrary, this doctrine allows an
employee to quit or be fired without liability on the part of the employer
or employee, with or without cause."'64 In addressing the claim of breach
of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, the court held: "[w]e further
note that neither the legislature nor the supreme court has recognized an
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in employment relation-
ships. ''65 The court also refused to recognize any good faith requirement.
The Texas Supreme Court has also repeatedly affirmed the fact that
there is absolutely no implied duty of good faith or fair dealing in the
employment context in Texas.66 In McClendon v. Ingersoll-Rand Co.,67
the court held that to imply a duty of good faith in an employment con-
text would violate its disapproval of placing restrictions on the free move-
ment of employees in the workplace.68 In addition, the court noted that
the massive amounts of legislation restricting an employer's right to ter-
minate an employee compels the conclusion that any change in the em-
ployment at-will doctrine should be left to the legislature. 69 The
legislature has never implied a duty of good faith and shows no signs of
doing so now.
2. The Reliance on the Promise
So what exactly did the Roberts court say Roberts was relying on? The
court held, as one of the three elements needed to invoke promissory
estoppel, that Roberts detrimentally relied on a "promise of employ-
ment" from Geosource. 70 The court had previously determined that the
employment relationship between Roberts and Geosource was an at-will
64. Id. at 814; see, e.g., Massey v. Houston Baptist Univ., 902 S.W.2d 81, 83 (Tex.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, writ denied); Reynolds Mfg. Co. v. Mendoza, 664 S.W.2d
536, 538 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1982, no writ); Maus v. National Living Ctrs., Inc., 633
S.W.2d 674, 675 (Tex. App.-Austin 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
65. Rios, 930 S.W.2d at 815; see also English v. Fischer, 660 S.W.2d 521, 522 (Tex.
1983); McClendon v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 757 S.W.2d 816, 819 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1988), rev'd on other grounds, 779 S.W.2d 69 (Tex. 1989).
66. See Caton v. Leach Corp., 896 F.2d 939, 948-49 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding that Texas
courts do not recognize a duty of good faith and fair dealing in employment relationships);
Rayburn v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the United States, 805 F. Supp. 1401 (S.D.
Tex. 1992); Federal Express Corp. v. Dutschmann, 846 S.W.2d 282 (Tex. 1993).
67. 757 S.W.2d at 816; see also Watson v. Zep Mfg. Co., 582 S.W.2d 178 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (refusing to decide whether Texas implied a good faith
requirement when neither the supreme court nor the legislature has done so).
68. See McClendon, 757 S.W.2d at 820.
69. See id.
70. Roberts v. Geosource Drilling Servs., Inc., 757 S.W.2d 48, 50 (Tex. App.-Houston
[1st Dist.] 1988, no writ).
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relationship. 71 Therefore, since employment at-will allows an employer
to terminate an employee at any time and without cause,72 how could
Roberts have relied on a "promise of employment"? Because Texas does
not imply any good faith or fair dealing exceptions to the at-will doc-
trine,73 is not the only promise Roberts could have received was that he
could be terminated at any time and without cause? The Roberts court
further held "it is no answer that the parties' written contract was for an
employment at-will."' 74 How could this not be an answer? The Texas Su-
preme Court and the Texas Legislature have affirmed that employees at-
will may be terminated at any time for any reason.75
In Collins,76 the facts were similar to the Roberts case in that an at-will
employee was fired before he began employment and after he had detri-
mentally relied on the defendant for that employment. The court stated
bluntly that any reliance upon an at-will employment agreement is unjus-
tified and promissory estoppel cannot be used as a shield against termina-
tion: "[A]ny promise was illusory and reliance on it was based upon
appellants' subjective expectations and was unjustified. We find that, as a
matter of law, neither promissory estoppel nor equitable estoppel is avail-
able to avoid termination at will ....
According to Texas statutes and case law, although contrary to the
holding in Roberts, Mr. Roberts should have had no promise of employ-
ment on which to rely and promissory estoppel should never have been
invoked. The Roberts court attempted to create an exception to the at-
will doctrine which does not exist in Texas and should not be found in the
doctrine of promissory estoppel through reliance on an illusory promise.
3. Courts Question the Promise
Although Roberts78 is the only Texas case that has allowed promissory
estoppel to circumvent the employment at-will doctrine, numerous other
states which claim to adhere to the traditional at-will doctrine have done
the same. 79 Even though these courts have allowed the use of promissory
estoppel to defeat the at-will doctrine, they continue to show their confu-
sion and possible disapproval in mixing the two doctrines. For example,
in Filcek v. Norris-Schmid, Inc.,80 the plaintiff resigned from his current
71. See id. at 48.
72. See Hussong v. Schwan's Sales Enters., Inc., 896 S.W.2d 320, 324 (Tex. App.-
Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, no writ).
73. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
74. Roberts, 757 S.W.2d at 50.
75. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
76. Collins v. Allied Pharmacist Management, Inc., 871 S.W.2d 929, 929 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, no writ).
77. Id. at 938.
78. 757 S.W.2d at 48.
79. See, e.g., Comeaux v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., 915 F.2d 1264 (9th Cir.
1990); Presto v. Sequoia Sys., Inc., 633 F. Supp. 1117 (D. Mass. 1986); Filcek v. Norris-
Schmid, Inc., 401 N.W.2d 318 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986); Grouse v. Group Health Plan, Inc.,
306 N.W.2d 114 (Minn. 1981); Mers v. Dispatch Printing Co., 483 N.E.2d 150 (Ohio 1985).
80. 401 N.W.2d at 318.
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employment in order to take a position with the defendant. After he
resigned his current employment position and before he began work with
the defendant, the defendant informed the plaintiff that his position was
no longer available. Plaintiff sued for breach of contract while the defen-
dant claimed that he was not entitled to damages because it was an at-will
relationship.
The court held there was no question that the employment, had it com-
menced, would have been at-will and terminable by either party. 81 The
court stated the rule in Michigan: "[C]ontracts for permanent or life em-
ployment are considered indefinite hirings which, absent distinguishing
features or consideration in addition to the services to be rendered, are
terminable at the will of either party."82 The court was persuaded to fol-
low earlier courts,83 since the Michigan Supreme Court had denied leave,
in holding that since the employee gave up his current employment rely-
ing on the defendant's promise of employment, this is considered a "dis-
tinguishing feature" and reliance damages must be given. The court
showed its reluctance in allowing promissory estoppel to be used in an at-
will relationship by comparing an at-will relationship, as altered by prom-
issory estoppel, to a magic wand turning a cow into a horse:
It is difficult to perceive why an employer-employee relationship
must be construed, as a matter of law, to be a contract of employ-
ment at will when the proofs are legally sufficient for submission to
the fact finder to determine otherwise. With one sweep of the judi-
cial wand, a cow was transformed into a horse. 84
The court went on to hold that because the plaintiff had detrimentally
relied on the promise of employment by the defendant, plaintiff had a
cause of action for breach of contract. 85
Again, upon what promise was the employee relying? The promise of
employment was at-will meaning that the employee could be fired at any
time for any reason. Texas courts, other than the Roberts court, have not
created this exception to the at-will doctrine. 86
81. See id. at 319.
82. Id. (emphasis added).
83. Unable to find any Michigan case law on point, the court based their decision on
the following passage:
A contract of employment to begin at a future time is totally broken by the
employer's refusal to begin such employment at that time. On such refusal,
the employee has a single action for his injury, measured by the full amount
of salary or wages promised, less what he can earn by reasonable effort in
other similar employment.
Id. at 319 (quoting 4 CORBIN ON CONTRACrS §§ 847, 958 (1964)).
84. Filcek, 401 N.W.2d at 319.
85. See id.
86. See Collins v. Allied Management, Inc., 871 S.W.2d 929 (Tex. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1995, no writ).
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B. THE PROBLEM WITH TIMING
1. The Before/After Distinction is Drawn
In addition to the question of what exactly the employee is relying on
(i.e., what is the actual promise?), the analysis of the Roberts court has an
additional problem. In its holding, the court seemingly drew a distinction
between the time before an at-will employee has begun employment, and
the time after an at-will employee has begun employment. Specifically,
the court stated that it was no answer that the party was an at-will em-
ployee when the employer terminates the relationship before the written
contract begins to operate:
It is no answer that the parties' written contract was for an em-
ployment-at-will, where the employer foreseeably and intentionally
induces the prospective employee to materially change his position
to his expense and detriment, and then repudiates its obligations
before the written contract begins to operate.87
"Before the written contract begins to operate" implies that the
court acknowledged that Geosource had no duty to provide contin-
ued employment to Roberts due to his at-will status. This implica-
tion is further reinforced by the court's statement: "[Geosource's]
undisputed oral promise clearly imposed a duty on Geosource to em-
ploy Roberts-but not for a fixed duration .... s88
2. The Result of the Before/After Distinction
This reasoning brings forth the following conclusion: an at-will em-
ployee who is fired before she begins performance has a viable cause of
action, while an at-will employee that is fired one second after she begins
performance has no cause of action. Can this be possible? If one follows
the Roberts court, the answer is seemingly yes. But a number of other
Texas courts have answered differently.8 9
3. Opposition to the Before/After Distinction In Texas
In Ingram v. Fred Oakley Chrysler-Dodge,90 the employee, Ingram, en-
tered into an employment agreement as a service manager with a salary
of $2,400.00 per month. In reliance on that agreement, he resigned from
his then-current position at Big D Chrysler Dodge. Approximately two
weeks later, he was informed that his service was no longer needed. In-
gram did not find any other employment for several weeks. As a result,
87. Roberts v. Georsource Drilling Servs., Inc., 757 S.W.2d 48, 50 (Tex. App.-Hous-
ton [1st Dist.] 1995, no writ) (emphasis added).
88. Id.
89. See, e.g., Ingram v. Fred Oakley Chrysler-Dodge, 663 S.W.2d 561, 562 (Tex.
App.-El Paso 1983, no writ); Collins, 871 S.W.2d at 929. "For purposes of the rule that
an oral contract of employment at will is not enforceable by either party, there is no dis-
tinction between termination of employment before starting work and termination after
employment has commenced." Patterson v. Leal, 942 S.W.2d 692, 694 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi 1997, writ denied).
90. 663 S.W.2d at 561.
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he filed suit admitting that he was an employee at-will but claiming that
he was entitled to damages because of the defendant's anticipatory repu-
diation of the contract. The court denied recovery of all damages stating
that the employment relationship was at-will, could be terminated by ei-
ther party without cause, and the "loss of wages that the employee would
have earned in the indefinite future is not a recoverable item of dam-
ages." 91 The court continued by holding that there is "no reason to make
a distinction between a termination of employment before one starts to
work and a termination after employment has commenced. ' 92 Other
courts have agreed.
In Collins,93 the court cited Ingram,94 in approval while holding that it
would make no sense to allow or disallow a cause of action based upon
whether the employer has begun working:
[W]e find it would be illogical to hold that an employee has no rem-
edy if he is fired one week after commencing work, but may recover
damages if the employer refuses to allow him to commence work at
all. An employee may quit at any time, or may never start perform-
ance and suffer no liability .... It is this freedom that is the basis of
our at-will employment rule.., which... continues to be endorsed
by our supreme court. 95
What could the Roberts court have meant by making this distinction
between allowing a cause of action before commencing work and not al-
lowing one after? The Roberts court was again faced with a similar situa-
tion in Leach v. Conoco, Inc.96 The facts of this case differ from Roberts,
though, because the plaintiff, Leach, was trying to recover losses based on
an oral promise from the employer to relocate to Norway for a period of
four years.97 The plaintiff was already an at-will employee with the de-
fendant, Conoco of Texas, but had accepted the relocation assignment.
The relocation assignment was offered and accepted through written let-
ters, none of which contained any information regarding the duration of
the expected employment. 98 In reliance upon the oral employment
agreement, the plaintiff had his wife resign from her current job, trans-
ported his car to Norway, made several trips to Norway to secure employ-
ment for the his wife, released the kids' nanny in expectation of the move,
and purchased numerous items that were recommended for living in Nor-
way. 99 After less than three months of employment in Norway, the plain-
tiff was transferred back to his former position in Texas.
91. Id. at 562.
92. Id.
93. 871 S.W.2d at 929.
94. 663 S.W.2d at 561.
95. Collins, 871 S.W.2d at 937; see also Casas v. Wornick Co., 818 S.W.2d 466, 469(Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1991), rev'd, 856 S.W.2d 732 (Tex. 1993).
96. 892 S.W.2d 954 (Tex. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1995, writ dism'd w.o.j.).
97. See id. at 956.
98. See id.
99. See id. at 957.
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The plaintiff brought action against his employer in promissory estop-
pel and fraud. To support his promissory estoppel claim, the plaintiff re-
lied upon this court's opinion in Roberts. The court distinguished the
plaintiff's case from the Roberts decision because, "unlike Roberts, the
facts of the present case show that the alleged oral employment agree-
ment.., was barred by the statute of frauds." 100 Therefore, the court was
not forced to explain why an employee at-will that is employed for any
time period-seemingly even a nanosecond-would be barred from a
cause of action, while an employee that never began employment could
retain one.
V. CONFUSION BEGINS IN THE COURTS OF APPEAL
While only adding to the confusion, other courts have tried to distin-
guish their cases from the Roberts decision. In Patterson v. Leal,l01 the
court seemingly drew its distinction on an irrelevant point. The plaintiff,
Leal, was working as a file clerk in Corpus Christi when she began
searching for a new job. She forwarded her resume to the defendants,
Patterson & Associates. The resume generated a phone call from some-
one at the Patterson office who asked about Leal's availability to begin
work on the following Monday while inviting her to an interview on
Thursday. Leal immediately resigned from her current employment in an-
ticipation of the position at Patterson. After Leal's interview, she was
instructed to call the office on Friday which she unsuccessfully tried to do.
It was not until Monday that Leal was able to contact the Patterson office
by telephone, during which time she was notified that the file clerk posi-
tion had been filled by another applicant. Leal sued Patterson relying on
Roberts.10 2
The court began its analysis of Leal's case by stating that if there was
an agreement of employment, which it did not have to decide, it would be
based upon an oral agreement between the two parties during their tele-
phone conversation. Because the oral agreement was for an indefinite
time period, it would be considered an at-will relationship. The court
then turned to Leal's claim for promissory estoppel. Leal argued that she
relied upon an oral promise of employment and should receive reliance
damages as in Roberts. The court distinguished Roberts by holding that
the Roberts decision was based upon a written contract, while Leal had
no written contract: "The Roberts case . . . is distinguishable from the
case at bar because the Roberts case involved an employment agreement
memorialized by a written contract. The nonexistence of a written con-
tract in the case at bar renders the Roberts decision inapposite .... -103
100. Id. at 960.
101. 942 S.W.2d 692, 694 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1997, writ denied).
102. See Roberts v. Geosource Drilling Servs., Inc., 757 S.W.2d 48 (Tex. App.-Hous-
ton [1st Dist.] 1995, no writ).
103. Patterson, 942 S.W.2d at 694 (emphasis added).
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Why does it render the Roberts decision an "inapposite?" An oral em-
ployment agreement for an indefinite time period passes the Statute of
Frauds defense and is considered an enforceable at-will agreement in
Texas just like a written employment agreement. 104 Is the court simply
using any excuse possible to distance itself from the Roberts decision?
The court further explained its distinction by holding "[w]e therefore can-
not create a cause of action for promissory estoppel when the underlying
evidence consists of purely oral representations as to employment for an
indefinite time period."' 05 Again, what is the difference between an en-
forceable oral at-will agreement and an enforceable written at-will agree-
ment? The court finally showed its desire to distance itself from the
Roberts decision by stating "[i]n any event, the Roberts decision was not
tested on appeal and has been subsequently criticized as 'wrongly de-
cided."1 06 This case only adds to the confusion.
VI. HOW OTHER JURISDICTIONS APPROACH THE ISSUE
A. THE GOOD FAITH IMPLICATION
Some courts that have allowed a party to recover damages in reliance
upon an at-will promise of employment do so on the basis of an implied
"good faith" obligation from the employer.10 7 The implication is that the
employee would not be willing to do such things as terminate her current
employment, incur numerous moving expenses, and reject other job op-
portunities, based on nothing. In other words, when an employee enters
into a contract, they are doing so under the impression that they will at
least be given a good faith chance to perform the job. Even if the em-
ployee enters the contract on the basis of at-will employment, they are
still relying on, at the very least, a chance to commence performance of
the contract. These courts imply this chance to commence performance
as an exception to the at-will doctrine.
A straightforward example of this approach is found in Grouse v.
104. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 26.01 (Vernon 1987).
105. Patterson, 942 S.W.2d at 695 (emphasis added).
106. Id. at 694.
107. See Grouse v. Group Health Plan, Inc., 306 N.W.2d 114, 116 (Minn. 1981);
Gorham v. Benson Optical, 539 N.W.2d 798 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995). For a case allowing the
implied covenant of good faith when public policies have been violated see Johnson v.
Chesebrough-Pond's USA Co., 918 F. Supp. 543 (D. Conn. 1996). Other courts have al-
lowed the implication of good faith and fair dealing only when they are able to establish
either an express or implied contract. See Cook v. Zion's First Nat'l Bank, 919 P.2d 56
(Utah App. 1996). Still other courts have allowed the implication of good faith and fair
dealing where public policy permitted. See Covert v. Allen Group, Inc., 597 F. Supp. 1268
(D. Colo. 1984); Eby v. York-Division, Borg-Warner, 455 N.E.2d 623 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983).
For additional information on the implied duty of good faith and promissory estoppel see
Maureen S. Binetti, The Employment-At-Will Doctrine: Have Its Exceptions Swallowed The
Rule? Common Law Limitations Upon An Employer's Control Over Employees-At-Will,
558 PLI/LIT 499 (1997); Michael B. Metzger & Michael J. Phillips, The Emergence of
Promissory Estoppel as an Independent Theory of Recovery, 35 RUTGERS L. REV. 472, 511-
512 (1983); Deborah A. Schmedemann, Working Backwards: The Covenant of Good Faith
and Fair Dealing in Employment Law, 16 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1119 (1990).
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Group Health Plan, Inc.10 8 The plaintiff, John Grouse, was working as a
retail pharmacist in Minneapolis when he began looking for a new phar-
maceutical job that offered better benefits and a better work environ-
ment. He learned that the defendant, Group Health, was accepting
applications. Grouse was interviewed at the time he turned the applica-
tion in and again two weeks later. Approximately three months later,
Grouse was offered a position as a pharmacist at Group Health. He im-
mediately accepted, but informed them that he was required to give his
current employer two weeks notice prior to his leaving. That afternoon,
Grouse received another pharmaceutical offer which he declined in reli-
ance upon the offer from Group Health. Two weeks later when Grouse
called to report that he was free to report to work, Group Health in-
formed him that his position had already been filled. Grouse had diffi-
culty finding other employment and filed suit to recover lost wages and
reliance damages for his foregone employment opportunities.
In determining the applicable theory of contract law, the court held
that promissory estoppel applied which "[implies] a contract in law where
none exists in fact." 109 Group Health argued that the employment at-will
doctrine could not support the application of promissory estoppel in this
case because it would result in the rule that an employee who is termi-
nated before he begins work has a cause of action, while an employee
who is terminated after he begins does not." 0 The court disagreed: "[w]e
cannot agree [with Grouse] since under appropriate circumstances we be-
lieve section 90 would apply even after employment has begun.""' The
court went further to hold that Grouse assumed he would be given a good
faith opportunity to perform his job, although this would not be the out-
come in every case:
The conclusion we reach does not imply that an employer will be
liable whenever he discharges an employee whose term of employ-
ment is at will. What we do hold is that under the facts of this case
the appellant had a right to assume he would be given a good faith
opportunity to perform his duties to the satisfaction of respondent
once he was on the job. 112
The analysis found in Grouse v. Group Health Plan was extended in
Gorham v. Benson Optical."3 The plaintiff, Gorham, was employed as a
store manager at LensCrafters when he was contacted by an employee
for the defendant, Benson Optical. An interview was set up in Chicago
108. 306 N.W.2d 114 (Minn. 1981).
109. Id. at 116.
110. See id.
111. Id. (emphasis added). Compare to the Texas Supreme Court which held, in re-
gards to promissory estoppel: "[tihis does not create a contract where none existed before,
but only prevents a party from insisting upon his strict legal rights when it would be unjust
to allow him to enforce them." Wheeler v. White, 398 S.W.2d 93, 96 (Tex. 1965).
112. Grouse, 306 N.W.2d at 116 (emphasis added). The court further noted: "[w]hen a
promise is enforced pursuant to section 90 '[t]he remedy granted for breach may be limited
as justice requires.' Relief may be limited to damages measured by the promisee's reli-
ance." Id.
113. 539 N.W.2d 798 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995).
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where Gorham traveled to interview. When Gorham called a few days
after the interview to inquire about the status of his application, he was
offered a job with Benson Optical that included a $50,000 salary package
and many other benefits. The employee that offered Gorham the job
promised that she would send him a confirmation letter and employee
packet. Gorham accepted the job over the phone and informed his cur-
rent employer of his resignation. When he did not receive the packet,
Gorham called and was assured that the "deal was finalized"'' 14 and that
he should go ahead and give his notice of resignation. After resigning
from his job, Gorham flew to Minneapolis to report for work with Ben-
son Optical. By the end of that same day, Gorham was told that he did
not possess the skill necessary to become an area manager and was
terminated.1 15
Gorham brought suit against Benson Optical seeking enforcement
through promissory estoppel. The court held that this case was the spe-
cific hypothetical that the Grouse court was discussing when it said,
"[u]nder appropriate circumstances we believe section 90 [of the Restate-
ment] would apply even after employment had begun.' 16 The court
found no significant distinction between Gorham, who had reported for
one day of work, and Grouse, who was fired before even one day of work.
The court held that, "[b]oth men relied to their detriment on the promise
of a new job, only to discover that the opportunity had disintegrated
before they ever actually started working. Neither man had a 'good faith
opportunity to perform his duties.""'11 7 The court went on to find that
Gorham was entitled to reliance damages on the theory of promissory
estoppel.118
Although the implication of good faith and fair dealing has been used
in some jurisdictions, it is not likely the Roberts court based its decision
on the same implication. As discussed above, Texas has simply refused,
both in the supreme court' 19 and in the legislature, 120 to imply a "good
faith and fair dealing" limitation in the employment at-will doctrine.' 2 '
114. Id. at 799.
115. See id. at 800.
116. Id. at 801.
117. Id.
118. See Gorham, 539 N.W.2d at 801.
1.19. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
120. See supra notes 37-42 and accompanying text.
121. Many feel as though the Texas employment at-will doctrine is too harsh in its out-
come. One author even pleads:
Texas should alter her unquestioning acceptance of the employment-at-will
rule and follow the lead of her sister states who have re-examined this nine-
teenth century doctrine and found it wanting in light of the technological,
social, and economic realities of this century .... It is imperative.., that the
Texas Legislature [enact legislation] which adequately protects employees
from wrongful discharge, promotes public policy as reflected in Texas stat-
utes, and at the same time protects the employer from needless and unjusti-
fied intrusion into his business operations.
Claudia E. Decker, The At-Will Doctrine: A Proposal To Modify The Texas Employment
Relationship, 36 BAYLOR L. REV. 667, 684, 688 (1984). But see Richard A. Epstein, In
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B. THE EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT/EMPLOYMENT
PROMISE DISTINCTION
Other courts have taken quite a different approach in allowing at-will
employees to recover damages if terminated before employment. In or-
der to allow some form of recovery for the termination of an employee
before commencing work, while justifying their not allowing recovery af-
ter an employee has worked any, these courts have drawn a distinction
between the "employment contract" and the "promise of
employment."' 122
In Comeaux v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co.,1 23 the plaintiff,
Comeaux, applied for the position of a sales representative with the de-
fendant, B&W. After several interviews with B&W, they made Comeaux
an offer that was contingent upon, among other things, him moving
"within five minutes of his first sales stop as soon as possible. '124 In addi-
tion, he was required to give his current employer one week resignation
notice and plan to begin work. Comeaux complied with all of B&W's
requests and reported to work. When he arrived, a manager from B&W
told him that his starting date would be a little delayed while assuring him
that there were no problems with his employment. During this time,
B&W ran a credit check on Comeaux that reflected a very poor credit
history. B&W fired Comeaux before he ever began work. Comeaux
filed suit against B&W alleging nine separate causes of action, two of
which were breach of contract and promissory estoppel. 125
In examining the employment relationship, the court heard testimony
from each of the parties. B&W contended that, according to the employ-
ment contract that Comeaux signed, their relationship was merely at-will
and they could fire him at any time and free of liability. They further
contended that the at-will basis of employment began the moment he
signed the agreement so that they could terminate the relationship imme-
diately if so needed. This particular provision in the contract read as
follows:
It is agreed and understood that by assigning me work with such sal-
ary as may be incident thereto, that this application shall constitute
the terms of the contract of employment and.., a hiring at will, termi-
nable by either of the parties thereto.126
The court concluded that, by the precise terms of the employment agree-
ment, the at-will relationship did not begin until Comeaux was assigned
"work and a salary. '127 Therefore, because he was never assigned work,
Defense of the Contract At Will, 51 U. CHI. L. REv. 947 (1984) (examining arguments both
for and against the contract at will).
122. Comeaux v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., 915 F.2d 1264 (9th Cir. 1990);
Bower v. AT&T at Techs., Inc., 852 F.2d 361 (8th Cir. 1988).
123. 915 F.2d at 1264.
124. Id. at 1266.
125. See id. at 1267.
126. Id. at 1269-1270 (emphasis added).
127. Id. at 1270.
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the at-will relationship was not controlling. More specifically, the court
held "[tihe writing does not deal with termination of the relationship
prior to B&W's assignment of work and salary to Comeaux. Only upon
such assignment does the writing show that the contract was supported by
independent consideration. '128
The court then examined the "promise for employment" that had come
from the oral agreement the parties had reached on the phone before the
contract was signed. They found that the express conditions of the offer
from B&W were that if Comeaux would (1) move, (2) terminate his cur-
rent employment, and (3) pass a physical examination, they would assign
him work and salary on August 18.129 These express oral agreements,
together with the written contract, formed the employment agreement
between the parties. But because B&W did not assign Comeaux work
and a salary, the court found that they breached their contractual agree-
ment (the promise to employ) and the at-will analysis was immaterial. 130
B&W was held liable for reliance damages.131
The Roberts court would have a hard time trying to prove their deci-
sion was based on the theory found in Comeaux.132 First, the contract
that Roberts signed did not contain any provisions requiring the parties
to do anything, except sign, in order for the contract to be effective. 133
Second, even if there was some question as to whether the employment
relationship was at-will, Texas implies an at-will presumption to all em-
ployment contracts. 134
C. THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN PROMISED EMPLOYMENT AND
ACTUAL HIRING
This theory was used again in Bower v. AT&T Technologies, Inc. 135 The
appellants were twenty-three AT&T workers who were laid off from their
jobs. AT&T specifically requested that appellants continue working in
their jobs until the actual layoff and promised to rehire them if they did.
The new jobs they were promised would be non-union at-will positions in
the company. Along with being rehired, appellants would continue to
receive all pension and other benefits. During the period of the actual
layoff, the appellants were constantly reassured jobs at AT&T and were
128. Id.
129. See Comeaux, 915 F.2d at 1270.
130. In its conclusion, the court stated:
[B]ecause B&W never assigned Comeaux work and a salary, the parties
never reached the point in time when the writing would begin to govern ter-
mination of the relationship. Therefore, whether or not Comeaux's ultimate
employment would have been at will is immaterial to our analysis of whether
the contract was breached before Comeaux's employment began.
Id.
131. See id. at 1271.
132. Id. at 1264.
133. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
134. See Mott v. Montgomery County, 882 S.W.2d 635, 637 (Tex. App.-Beaumont
1994, writ denied).
135. 852 F.2d 361 (8th Cir. 1988).
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encouraged to wait. Appellants turned down job offers and delayed job
searches in reliance upon these promises; however, when AT&T began
hiring for the new positions promised to appellants, none of the appel-
lants were rehired. The appellants sued seeking $50,000 each in compen-
satory damages and injunctive relief that each be reinstated to their past
positions.
In addressing the appellants' claim of promissory estoppel, the court
found that AT&T was liable for any detrimental reliance the appellants
incurred as a result of their reliance on the promise of employment. The
court began its analysis by distinguishing between a case in which an em-
ployee at-will is terminated after hire and before work begins from an
employee that is prevented from assuming promised at-will employment.
The court found that "[s]hould [an] employer decide after hire to dis-
charge the employee or change the terms of employment, she is com-
pletely within her rights and in utter compliance with her promise. 136 But
the court found that when an at-will employee is promised employment
and never hired, that employee is entitled to recovery. 137 The court fur-
ther held that if AT&T had hired the employees at-will and then fired
them they would have been within their rights, but since they never actu-
ally hired the employees, they were bound by their promise to employ
them:
In the present dispute, AT&T has promised ...at-will positions.
That AT&T may shortly thereafter fire them at-will... does not fully
eradicate the binding quality of its promise. Clearly, a contract
which by its terms can be immediately terminated after it is com-
menced precludes a claimant from maintaining an action upon dis-
charge after hire. This, however, does not prevent the claimant from
recovering damages sustained in reliance on a clear and unambigu-
ous promise that is broken.1 38
The court acknowledged the fact that distinguishing between the two
theories may be difficult, but the simple answer is that an employer that
hires and fires has kept its promise while an employer who has never
hired has not:
While, in practical effect, it may be hard to distinguish between the
case in which an employee is fired a day after beginning work from
the situation in which a potential employee is prevented from assum-
ing a promised at-will position, the cases are different. In the former
case, the employer has completely fulfilled his promise; in the latter,
the promise has not been kept in any respect. 139
In both of the cases above, the courts distinguished between the em-
ployer's "promise to employ" versus the employer's "employment agree-
ment" and the employer's "promise to employ" versus the "actual
hiring." The courts made this distinction in slightly different ways. In the
136. Id. at 363 (emphasis added).
137. See id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 363-64.
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former case, the court found that there was an actual contract which was
formed by a combination of the parties express oral promises and their
written contract agreement. The "promise to employ" was separated
from the "employment agreement" because the court found that the em-
ployment agreement, which included the at-will provision, was breached
by the employer. This allowed the court to hold that the at-will provision
of the employment agreement was not binding upon the employee and
find reliance on the oral promises made separate from the writing. In the
latter case, there was no actual contractual agreement found. The "prom-
ise to employ" was separated from the "employment agreement" (actual
hire) because the employees were never actually hired. The employees
had simply relied upon promises of employment made by the employers.
The analysis followed in the case above could not be used to justify the
Roberts decision either. In Roberts, it was clear, and the court held, that
Roberts was already hired and under a written contract of employment
with Geosource. 140 Therefore, there was no question as to whether Rob-
erts had actually been hired.
D. THE EXPECTATION/RELIANCE DISTINCTION
Another way courts have distinguished at-will employees who are ter-
minated before commencing work from those terminated after commenc-
ing work is through damages. The basic idea is this: if you are an
employee at-will, you should not be able to recover expectation damages
because you cannot expect anything since you could be fired the minute
you walk in the door; but, you should be able to collect reliance damages
based upon any detrimental reliance incurred in preparation for the job.
Some courts even hold that reliance damages are available for at-will em-
ployees who are terminated even after some length of employment. 41
The following cases help illustrate these points.
In Pepsi-Cola Bottlers, Inc. v. Woods,142 Woods, an employee, was in-
terviewed and hired by Pepsi as a route settlement clerk. It was discov-
ered in the interview that Woods had a boyfriend who was currently
working at Coca-Cola, but she was assured that would not be a problem.
After the interview, Pepsi informed Woods that she was to start her new
job on March 26 and should terminate her current employment accord-
ingly. Before Woods was to report to work, Pepsi informed her that she
140. Roberts v. Geosource Drilling Servs., Inc., 747 S.W.2d 48, 49 (Tex. App.-Houston
[1st Dist.] 1998, no writ).
141. See Grouse v. Group Health Plan, Inc., 306 N.W.2d 114 (Minn. 1981). In response
to an employer's claim that allowing reliance damages to an at-will employee who was
fired before commencing performance, while barring the same employee from any remedy
if he was allowed to work for one day, would be unfair, the court responded: "[Wle cannot
agree since under appropriate circumstances we believe section 90 would apply even after
employment has begun." Id. The court is likely implying that even if the at-will employee
was terminated after his first day at work he would still be allowed to recover reliance
damages. For further analysis on this point see Melvin A. Eisenberg, Probability and
Chance in Contract Law, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1005, 1029 (1998).
142. 440 N.E.2d 696 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982).
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was discharged because she would be exposed to confidential information
at Pepsi. Woods had already terminated her current employment so she
sued to recover her damages.
In determining Pepsi's responsibility to Woods, Pepsi claimed they
were not liable for any damages because Woods was employed at-will and
could be terminated any time. The court agreed with Pepsi's argument,
but only in relation to expectation damages, holding that Woods was an
at-will employee and could have been fired at any time while incurring
little or no damages:
The only thing ... Pepsi promised was that Woods could work for
Pepsi until either party decided to terminate their relationship....
[W]e have no way to determine the amount of wages to which
Woods was entitled, since under the circumstances Pepsi could have
discharged her after a single day's work without incurring liability.14 3
The court did, however, find that Woods was entitled to reliance dam-
ages under the doctrine of promissory estoppel. 144 Because Woods relied
on the promise of employment given by Pepsi, she was found to be enti-
tled to those damages. In this particular case, however, Woods was not
awarded any reliance damages because she had insufficient proof of those
damages.145
A clearer example is shown in D&G Strout, Inc. v. Bacardi Imports,
Inc.'46 D&G was a distributor of liquor in Northern Indiana. When
D&G lost two of its biggest suppliers it knew it could either sell out while
the market was still good, or attempt to compete on a smaller scale. Ba-
cardi, one of D&G's other suppliers, was aware of D&G's predicament
and promised them they would continue to use them as their Indiana
distributor. Relying on this promise, D&G turned down a negotiated of-
fer to sell the store. Bacardi, one week later, canceled their account with
D&G. Faced with no other choices, D&G then sold the store at an
amount $550,000 below the original offer. D&G sued Bacardi in promis-
sory estoppel to recover the $550,000.
The relationship between D&G and Bacardi was found to be at-will. 147
The United States Court of Appeals went on to state that although an
employee could not sue for lost wages on an unfulfilled promise of at-will
employment, lost wages are not the only damages that come from a bro-
ken promise.148 The court held that reliance damages are recoverable
when the employer breaks a promise to an employee, even if the employ-
ment relationship is at-will. 149 The court further explained the difference
between expectation damages and reliance damages as being those dam-
143. Id. at 700.
144. See id.
145. See id.
146. 923 F.2d 566 (7th Cir. 1991).





ages which the employee could expect (zero), and those which the em-
ployee incurred as a direct result of the employers promise to employ:
In future wages, the employee has only an expectation of [future]
income, the recovery of which promissory estoppel will not support
in an at-will employment setting. In wages foregone in order to pre-
pare for the move, as in moving expenses themselves, the employee
gave up a presently determinant sum for the purpose of relocating.
Both moving expenses and forgone wages were the hopeful em-
ployee's costs of positioning himself for his new job; moving ex-
penses happen to be out-of-pocket losses, while foregone wages are
opportunity costs. Both are reliance costs, not expectancy
damages. 50
The court held that Bacardi's promise was one upon which D&G could
have relied and damages should be given accordingly. 151
In Lorson v. Falcon Coach, Inc.,152 the court found that reliance dam-
ages should be given to an employee who was terminated before com-
mencing performance. The employee, Lorson, was contacted by Falcon
Coach concerning possible employment. After several interviews in dif-
ferent states with Falcon, Lorson accepted the job offer. In reliance on
his new job, Lorson rented a house and arranged for a moving van to
move his furniture to his new place. When Lorson returned home, he
was informed by Falcon that he no longer had a job. Falcon further re-
fused to pay any moving expenses incurred. As a result, the moving van,
which included all of Lorson's furniture, refused to unload it at his new
residence and instead took it to a storage facility where they left it. Lor-
son sued Falcon for all damages incurred as a result of the transaction.
The court found that because this was an employment at-will relation-
ship, Lorson was not able to collect damages for lost wages (expecta-
tion). 153 However, the court did hold: "[w]e believe the allegations of
[Larson's] petition are sufficient to state a cause of action for damages for
the breach of a quasi contract based upon plaintiff's reliance to his detri-
ment on defendant's promise . . .and, thus, incurring moving expenses
and storage costs."'1 54
The distinction between expectation damages and reliance damages is
one possible explanation of the Roberts court's distinction between termi-
nation of an employee before and after commencing work. If the court
was simply intending to distinguish between the amount of damages the
parties could recover and not whether they actually had a cause of action,
the distinction might be plausible. If, however, the Roberts court was im-
plying that an at-will employee terminated before commencing work
would sustain a cause of action while the same employee, if terminated
after commencing work, would not, the result would be puzzling at best.
150. Id. at 569.
151. See id.
152. 522 P.2d 449 (Kan. 1974).
153. See id. at 457.
154. Id.
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Setting the before/after distinction aside, the problem of finding a
"promise" able to withstand reliance still remains. Without the element
of reliance (due to the fact there was no guaranteed employment to rely
upon), no employee has any cause of action in promissory estoppel.
Therefore, even if the before/after distinction can be justified through
damages, the Roberts court still had no promise on which to base allowing
any reliance damages.
VII. THE MOTIVES BEHIND THE ROBERTS DECISION
The actions of the Roberts court in allowing an at-will employee to re-
ceive damages in reliance upon at-will employment simply cannot be jus-
tified by Texas laws regarding both employment at-will and promissory
estoppel. The basis of promissory estoppel centers upon the finding of a
promise that one party made to another. The Roberts court found that
this promise was a "promise of employment." The problem is that Texas
follows a "pure" employment at-will doctrine with only few exceptions-
none of which applied in the Roberts case. Therefore, because an at-will
employee can be terminated at any time for no cause, there simply was
no "promise of employment" upon which Roberts could rely. In reality,
the Roberts court tried to create an exception to what the court, and
many others, perceive to be the often harsh results of the at-will doctrine.
VIII. THE AUTHORITY OF THE ROBERTS COURT
Whether you believe the exception created to the at-will doctrine in the
Roberts decision was a valiant effort on the part of the court to provide
justice to an individual or simply a misuse of promissory estoppel, the
underlying reality is that the Roberts court may not have had the author-
ity to make its decision. Lower courts in Texas may possess limited au-
thority to create judicial exceptions to the at-will doctrine; yet, this is
exactly what the Roberts court did.
In Jennings v. Minco Technology Labs, Inc.,155 the employee, Jennings,
brought suit against her employer, Minco Technology Labs, Inc. (Minco),
after they implemented a mandatory urinalysis for all employees while
reserving the right to terminate any employee that did not participate.
All employees of Minco, at the time, were at-will employees. Specifically,
Jennings asked the court to create an exception to the freedom of the at-
will doctrine. Jennings claimed the Texas court had the authority to mod-
ify the at-will doctrine when necessary to effectuate an important public
policy, as was done by the Texas Supreme Court in Sabine Pilot Service,
Inc. v. Hauck.156 The court responded by stating that Sabine Pilot does
not stand for the proposition that lower courts have the right to create
exceptions to the at-will doctrine; in fact, it stands for just the opposite:
155. 765 S.W.2d 497 (Tex. App.-Austin 1989, writ denied).
156. 687 S.W.2d 733 (Tex. 1985) (creating a narrow exception to the employer's right to
terminate an employee who refuses to perform an illegal act).
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The opinion in Sabine Pilot does not purport to be an obituary for
the "at will doctrine.". . . Sabine Pilot implies, without any doubt,
that lower courts are not licensed in that opinion to modify the Su-
preme Court's earlier decision ... that lower courts are not free to
create additional exceptions analogous to the 'very narrow excep-
tion' created in Sabine Pilot itself.1 57
The court further added that courts are bound by stare decisis and should
not act in this area unless given clear authority by the supreme court:
Notwithstanding the allure (and complexities) of judicial lawmaking,
there is such a thing as stare decisis applicable to trial and lower
appellate courts. The Supreme Court would have given clearer indi-
cations of its intention had it really meant in Sabine Pilot to free
lower courts of their duty to obey the rule of contract law laid down
... [in an at-will employment contract]. 158
The court seemingly strengthened its stand disallowing judicial excep-
tions to the at-will doctrine in Maus v. National Living Centers, Inc. 159
The appellant, Sofia Maus, was a nurse's aid in San Angelo for thirteen
years. She was a loyal worker who commonly worked double shifts and
showed a genuine concern for her patients. In 1979, National Living Cen-
ters purchased the nursing home. Immediately thereafter, Maus often
complained to her superiors that the patients were receiving poor care
and treatment. On one occasion, a patient had a stroke and Maus's
superiors allegedly refused to call a doctor. Maus personally performed
CPR which kept the patient alive for several days. The patient eventually
died. In alleged retaliation for her complaints, National Living Centers
fired Maus, who was an at-will employee.
In her plea before the court, Maus explained to the court that not only
was she concerned for her patients lives, but she was also required to
report cases of abuse under a Texas statute. 160 The statute requires nurs-
ing home owners and employees to report cases of abuse or neglect to the
state licensing agency or to local law enforcement officers. In addition,
failure to report is considered a Class A misdemeanor. The court quickly
noted that the legislature, however, did not create any cause of action as a
remedy for those fired in retaliation. Therefore, the court afforded Maus
no relief stating: "[t]his Court must follow decisions of the Texas Supreme
Court and leave any changes in the law to that Court."'16 1
As shown in the cases above, lower courts in Texas are viewed by other
courts as having virtually no authority to create judicial exceptions to the
at-will doctrine. By allowing Roberts to proceed on a claim of promis-
sory estoppel in reliance upon a "promise of employment," the Roberts
court attempted to create an additional exception to the at-will doctrine.
157. Jennings, 765 S.W.2d at 500-01.
158. Id. at 501.
159. 633 S.W.2d 674 (Tex. App.-Austin 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
160. See TEx. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 4442c, §16 (Vernon Supp. 1982), repealed by
Acts 1989, 71st Leg., ch. 678, § 13(1) (now TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN.
§ 242.122(c) (Vernon 1992)).
161. Maus, 633 S.W.2d at 675.
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Seemingly, the only way any additional exceptions to the at-will doc-
trine will be created is through the Supreme Court of Texas or the Texas
Legislature. Other legislatures, like the California Legislature, have en-
acted statutes that prohibit any person from influencing or persuading
any person to come to work through knowingly false representations of
the existence of work, the length of work, or the conditions surrounding
the work.162 Any person who violates this statute may be liable for
double damages resulting from the misrepresentations. 163 But, as ex-
plained above, Texas presently has no such statutes.
IX. THE REALITY OF THE ROBERTS DECISION
The Roberts decision cannot be considered "good" law in Texas. As
shown above, there are three main problems with the court's decision in
holding that a promissory estoppel action can circumvent Texas' powerful
at-will doctrine. First, there was no promise upon which Roberts could
rely. Promissory estoppel is based on the idea that there must be a prom-
ise on which a party has relied to their detriment in order to invoke es-
toppel. In Roberts the promise made by Geosource was merely an at-will
promise, which is an illusory promise that could be freely broken at any
time by either of the two parties. Therefore, the only thing that Roberts
could have relied upon is that he could be terminated at any time for any
reason. Since Geosource could terminate Roberts whenever they
pleased, there was nothing upon which Roberts could rely.
Second, the Roberts decision cannot be considered valid because it
would create an illogical outcome in a vast area of future case law in
Texas. The Roberts decision implies that an employee who is terminated
before beginning an at-will employment relationship should be allowed to
collect reliance damages while an employee that is terminated after be-
162. California statute § 970 reads:
No person, or agent or other officer thereof, directly or indirectly, shall influ-
ence, persuade, or engage any person to change from one place to another in
this State or from any place outside to any place within the State, or from any
place within the State to any place outside, for the purpose of working in any
branch of labor, through or by means of knowingly false representations,
whether spoken, written, or advertised in printed form, concerning either:
(a) The kind, character, or existence of such work;
(b) The length of time such work will last, or the compensation therefor;
(c) The sanitary or housing conditions relating to or surrounding the work;
(d) The existence or nonexistence of any strike, lockout, or other labor dis-
pute affecting it and pending between the proposed employer and the per-
sons then or last engaged in the performance of the labor for which the
employee is sought.
CAL. LAB. CODE § 970 (West 1989).
163. California statute § 972 reads:
In addition to such criminal penalty, any person, or agent or officer thereof
who violates any provision of section 970 is liable to the party aggrieved, in a
civil action, for double damages resulting from such misrepresentations. Such
civil action may be brought by an aggrieved person or his assigns or succes-
sors in interest, without first establishing any criminal liability.
CAL. LAB. CODE § 972 (West 1989).
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ginning work-seemingly for even a second-could not sustain a claim
for any damages. This illogical result seems to defeat the entire purpose
of the Roberts decision. The Roberts court intended to protect a "rely-
ing" employee that incurred expenses based upon future employment.
The outcome above would seem to induce employers into delaying termi-
nation of an at-will employee until they had worked in their business for
at least a minute. By delaying the termination, the employee would incur
greater expenses and the employer would not be liable for any of them.
Finally, Roberts may have limited authority to create an additional ex-
ception to the at-will doctrine. Lower courts are bound by stare decisis
and are not free to jump into the complexities of judicial lawmaking. The
Texas Supreme Court and the Texas Legislature have continually af-
firmed the fact that Texas follows the "pure" at-will doctrine with few
exceptions-none of which apply to the Roberts decision.
X. "PURE" EMPLOYMENT AT-WILL: STILL GOOD LAW?
The employment at-will doctrine has been the subject of great contro-
versy since its beginning. Some believe the idea of allowing an employee
to be terminated at any time for any reason is a doctrine and belief that
should have left this country well before the twentieth century. They la-
bel it "archaic" and find the doctrine "wanting in light of the technologi-
cal, social, and economic realities of this century."' 164 Still others find that
the at-will doctrine follows along with the twentieth century by giving
employers, as well as employees, the freedom to move freely throughout
the marketplace. Below are some of the arguments and policy issues con-
cerning both sides of the issue.
A. THE EMPLOYEE'S PERSPECTIVE
The risks associated with changing jobs while supporting a family are
large enough without the added stress of absolutely no job security. Em-
ployees who accept job offers from employers on an at-will basis in Texas
can potentially place their families in a position of financial instability
from which they may not recover. For example, suppose the father of a
family of four living in Utah receives a construction job offer in Texas
that almost doubles his salary. Because the family is struggling to get by
on its current salary, the father accepts the position immediately. In
preparation for the move, the father terminates his current employment,
sells the family house, rents a moving van for his furniture, withdraws his
children from school, and purchases a home in Texas. When the family
arrives in Texas, the father is informed that he is no longer needed for the
job and there are no other positions available. What is he to do?
All of the expenses mentioned above are modest at best. Relocating to
a new state or another area of the same state is a major financial decision
164. Decker, supra note 121, at 684.
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in one's life. 165 In a pure employment at-will state like Texas, unless an
exception is made to the at-will doctrine, the person and his family in the
hypothetical above have no recovery of their expenses. They simply "re-
lied" (gambled) on the fact that the employer would give them a chance
to work and prove themselves. Can this possibly be fair?
In addition to the financial difficulties in which employees can be
placed, the employment at-will doctrine has led to other seemingly harsh
results. 166 Employees could be forced to stay in a verbally abusive situa-
tion by a power-hungry supervisor for fear of losing their jobs. Other
employees might be encouraged to refrain from reporting certain illegal
acts for fear of retaliation. Recall Maus v. National Living Centers,
Inc.,167 where the appellant, a nurse, was terminated in an alleged retalia-
tory action taken against her because of her continual complaining about
poor care that patients in the nursing home were receiving. Recall also
that in one instance a patient suffered a stroke and later died as a result
of that stroke, while National Living Center allegedly refused to call a
doctor. Maus personally kept the patient alive with C.P.R. for several
days. Because Maus was an employee at-will and Texas had no excep-
tions to the doctrine forbidding retaliatory termination, the court held for
National Living Centers and offered Maus nothing.
Still other opponents to the at-will doctrine suggest that the at-will em-
ployment structure may have worked in the nineteenth century when jobs
were plentiful and required less skill, but the twentieth century, with its
increased technology, has made "job-hopping" much more difficult.1 68 A
higher number of jobs today require a skill that is not common to every-
one, thereby making it more difficult to remain flexible in the job
market.169
In addition, the twentieth century has seen an increase in the number
of large corporations that seemingly dominate entire labor markets. Al-
lowing these powerful economic entities to control the less mobile and
dependent individual without justification allows these individuals to be
exploited. 170
165. See generally Manesh K. Rath, Left Standing at the Altar: How Relocation Affects
the Employment Relationship, 37 S. TEX. L. REV. 813 (1996) (examining different courts'
approaches to employment at-will in relocation circumstances).
166. See Phillips v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 651 F.2d 1051 (5th Cir. 1981) (refus-
ing to recognize a public policy exception to the at-will rule even though plaintiff was
terminated for giving truthful testimony in an anti-trust suit against defendant), reh'g de-
nied, 671 F.2d 860 (5th Cir. 1982); see also Maus, 633 S.W.2d 674, 676 (Tex. App.-Austin
1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (refusing to create a public policy exception to the at-will doctrine
for appellant who was fired for reporting her abusive and neglectful nursing home opera-
tor/employer to the authorities, even though she was required by statute to do so).
167. 633 S.W.2d at 674.
168. See Debra Greenberg, Employment at Will: A Proposal to Adopt the Public Policy
Exception in Florida, 34 U. FLA. L. REV. 614, 621-22 (1982).
169. See id.
170. See generally Epstein, supra note 34, at 974 (examining myths of the contract at-
will while discussing the benefits it brings to everyone).
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Finally, the argument has been made that the "risk" in hiring new em-
ployees should be placed on the employer, rather than the employee, dur-
ing the time before the employee begins work. In many other areas of the
law, the law shifts the risk onto the person that has the better chance of
avoiding it in the first place. Employers are viewed as being in a better
position to avoid the risk by evaluating their circumstances and the ability
of the employee before they offer a new job. By not offering the job until
the employer is absolutely sure they need the worker, the entire situation
would be resolved-for the employee.
B. THE EMPLOYER'S PERSPECTIVE
There are three commonly argued points in favor of the at-will doctrine
from the standpoint of the employer. 17' First, the risks to an employer
associated with offering a job to an at-will employee are often over-
looked. In addition to the normal transaction costs that follow the hiring
of a new employee, there are additional costs such as training the individ-
ual, the potential loss of any unprotected trade secrets, the possibility of
an employee "learning the ropes" and then leaving with some of the com-
pany's clients, and any foregone opportunities to hire additional highly
qualified individuals in the job market.
Second, the at-will employment doctrine has been argued to be a posi-
tive influence on the workforce. The idea that an employer can fire an
employee at any time for any reason increases productivity and efficiency
in the business. Employees that enjoy the protection of certain job secur-
ity have a tendency to put forth the minimal effort during the day and
rush out at night instead of continually striving to do their best.
Finally, the at-will doctrine has been praised for its allowance of the
freedom to contract. 172 Employer's have special needs in their businesses
and they have to keep personnel on their staff that can meet those needs.
By allowing them to freely contract around provisions that would alter
the at-will employment relationship, employers are free to shape their
businesses as they choose. Otherwise, employers could potentially face
situations where an employee that hurt their business could not be termi-
nated for fear of a lawsuit. The threat of major lawsuits are real and are,
in a sense, deterred by the at-will doctrine.
XI. CONCLUSION
The employment at-will doctrine in Texas is as strong as ever, and it
appears that the Texas Supreme Court and the Texas Legislature intend
to keep it that way. Although it seems that many harsh results have and
will come from the continued support of the doctrine, employment at-will
has allowed a freedom in employment relationships that has benefited
the labor market. When an employee is not performing to the level that
171. See generally id. at 947 (defending the contract at-will).
172. See id. at 953-54.
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they were hired to achieve, perhaps even deterring business, employers
can freely terminate that employee without the fear of a frivolous lawsuit.
When employees get a chance to take a better job in a business across the
street or in another state, they can take that increased salary or better
position without fear of lawsuits or penalties for leaving early. However,
employers and employees alike must protect themselves against the pos-
sibility of losing an employee or their job.
Employers can protect themselves from losing a valuable employee by
providing them with reasons for staying. Opportunities for promotions or
advancement, a chance to earn bonuses or recognition amongst piers, and
a way to voice their concerns about the company can all help. But em-
ployers must be extremely careful not to make any verbal or written com-
munication that could be construed as representations about the
employee's length of employment. Phrases such as, "You keep it up and
we'll keep you around for a while," and "We need people like you at this
company for a long time," can terminate the at-will relationship and lock
employers into a binding employment agreement.
Employees can also protect themselves from possible disappointment
or even devastation by not getting locked into one position. Employees
should try to learn as many aspects of the job as they can while picking up
particular skills such as computer literacy. In addition, employees should
be careful not to get too relaxed on the job, thereby only performing at a
minimal level.
In conclusion, Texas law surrounding the area of employment at-will
remains virtually unchanged after one hundred years of employment.
The holding of the Roberts court is a mere example of a court's desire to
lessen the sometimes harsh effects of the at-will doctrine, but in no way
creates an additional exception to the at-will doctrine. Exceptions to the
at-will doctrine can only be made by the Texas Supreme Court or the
Texas Legislature. If the Texas Supreme Court has an opportunity to
hear a case concerning the issue, it should take that opportunity to put an
end to the confusion caused by the Roberts decision.
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